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DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
A COMPARISON OF TWO SYSTEMS
JOSEPH M. SNEE, S.J.* AND A. KENNETH PYEI
The initial problem facing the lawyer who attempts to compare
the criminal procedure of his own country with that of other nations
is the way in which to approach the study of so complex a subject.
Too often in the past, the assumption has been made that a meaningful
result can be obtained by comparing the language of the statutes or
constitutional provisions of one country with those of another and
concluding that when the language is the same, the law is the same,
and where the language is different, the law is different. The chief
advantage of such a comparison is in its simplicity, in that the only
variables are the differences in language or the omission of provi-
sions in the law of one nation which is found in the law of another.
The overwhelming disadvantage is that such a study often results in
misleading conclusions as to the extent of similarities or differences.
The first step in a comparison of laws must be a determination
of what the law of one nation is in order that the laws of other
nations may be compared with it. This in itself imposes a substantial
problem when such a broad field as criminal procedure is the subject
of study. There are obviously substantial differences between criminal
procedure in our federal courts and the systems of procedure followed
in many of the courts of our fifty states. Only the elastic concept of
due process of law in the federal constitution and the various provi-
sions of state constitutions restrict experimentation by the states with
procedural innovations unknown to the traditional common law sys-
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tern. The restrictions of the Bill of Rights have prevented such ex-
tensive procedural change by the federal government, although the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have illustrated that significant
changes can be made within the comparatively rigid federal structure.
For the purpose of providing a basis of comparison with the laws
of other nations, the basic similarities found in our state and federal
systems are more important than the interesting differences. In an
understanding of these points of similarity we can perhaps determine
what Americans regard as the fundamentals of a fair system for the
administration of criminal justice.
The hard core of these similarities can be found in the require-
ments of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
problem then becomes one of determining the meaning of this term.
It is one thing to state that due process is "that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice"' or to describe it as the em-
bodiment of those rights which are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"2 or to determine whether it has been violated by deciding
whether there has been an abridgment of a "principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."'3 It is a more difficult task to determine the rights
to which an accused is entitled.
To determine this question it is obviously necessary to catalogue
the cases. This alone is not adequate, however, since not all or even
most of the cases were decided by the present Court. It may be argued
persuasively that some of the nineteenth century cases would not be
decided the same way today. Furthermore, there are many questions
which have never been decided. The Supreme Court has held that
indictment by grand jury is not necessary,4 trial by common law jury
is not necessary,5 the accused does not have to be afforded the privi-
lege against self-incrimination,6 a state court may admit evidence
obtained by unreasonable search and seizure,7 a conviction may rest
in part upon affidavits,8 the state may be permitted to appeal on a
question of law,9 and an accused may be tried without counsel being
I Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1943).
2 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
3 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
4 Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884).
G Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
e Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908).
7 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960).
8 West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
9 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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provided for him by the state in some cases, without depriving the
defendant of due process of law.' Each of these factors in a dif-
ferent factual setting might well result in the conclusion that there
had not been "fundamental fairness."
Furthermore, the common background of all of our systems
of criminal procedure has resulted in uniformity among the states in
insuring certain rights. Where every state affords the right to an
accused, the Supreme Court is not called upon to determine whether
under the due process clause the accused is entitled to such a pro-
cedure. Thus the Supreme Court has not been required to determine
whether a state could abolish the concept of cross-examination by
counsel altogether, could permit the finders of fact to read the grand
jury transcript and the police reports prior to the beginning of the
trial, could try an accused in absentia if he was served with process
outside the state, or could alter the rules of evidence so drastically
that evidence of bad character, hearsay and opinion evidence could
be admitted without objection and form the basis for a conviction. In
these areas we can only hope to reason by analogy.
In using the due process clause as the standard we should not
lose sight of the fact that it is an arbitrary basis in that it does not
embrace all the common elements in the American system. Thus,
while the privilege against self-incrimination contained in the fifth
amendment has been held not to be included in the requirement of
due process of law, the constitution of every state except two protects
an accused from self-incrimination by state constitutional provision. 1
To say it is not a fundamental right in American criminal procedure
simply because it was once held not to be protected by the fourteenth
amendment is to ignore reality.
Assuming that a common basis of what American law regards as
fundamental can be determined within these limitations, the second
step is to determine which other countries should be the subject of
study. An ambitious undertaking should include the study of all the
nations of the civilized world. Such a project has been undertaken by the
International Commission of Jurists in its study of the Rule of Law. 2
10 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See also Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts (1955).
11 McCormick, Evidence 256 (1954).
12 The study has already produced considerable comment in the journals. The
developments of the study may be traced in the Bulletins and in the Journals of the
International Commission of Jurists. See also: "Rule of Law in the United States,
Germany, Scandinavia, Turkey and Mexico," 9 Annales de la Facult6 de Droit d'Istan-
bul, No. 12; Katz, "Rule of Law in Oriental Countries," 6 Am. J. Comp. L. 520 (1957);
Kiralfy, "The Rule of Law in Communist Europe," 8 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 465 (1959);
Letourneur & Drago, "The Rule of Law as Understood in France," 7 Am. J. Comp. L.
147 (1958).
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Questionnaires have been sent to the bench, bar, and to legal educators
in all countries belonging to the United Nations. The evaluation of
the responses will give much insight into this immense undertaking,
although it may be questioned whether the questionnaire method will
provide a sufficient basis in itself for definitive conclusions. 3
Such a project is obviously too vast an undertaking for a single
article. Fortunately, such a comprehensive study is not essential in
order to gain some understanding of the basic concepts of due process
in criminal proceedings.
Two major systems of law are in existence-the civil law system
and the common law system. The United States, the British Common-
wealth of Nations, and many of the newly emerging nations of the
world which were formerly governed by the United Kingdom, have
the basis of their criminal procedure in the common law. The remain-
ing nations of Europe, the nations of Latin America, Turkey, and the
former Belgian, French and Dutch colonial possessions, have systems
based on the civil law. Japan has a civil law background, upon which
many American concepts have been engrafted.' 4 Nationalist China
likewise looks to the civil law for the structure of its criminal pro-
cedure. 15
While it is infeasible to discuss the technical provisions of the
codes of every nation, it is possible to compare the common elements
in American criminal procedure with the common elements in the
criminal procedure of the civil law countries. The fact that certain
common elements exist is clear from the agreement among the western
European nations on an enumeration of the basic rights to which every
person accused of crime is entitled-in the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 6
13 The American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal
justice in the United States rejected such an approach in favor of personal observations
by trained staff members. See American Bar Foundation, "Plan for Survey" (1955).
14 Abe, "Criminal Procedure in Japan," 48 J. Crim. L. 359 (1957).
15 Wang, "Chinese and American Criminal Law," 46 J. Crim. L. 796 (1956)
(primarily concerned with substantive criminal law).
1A "Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950)," 45 Am. J. Int. L. 24 (1951) [henceforth cited as "The European Convention"].
See Green, "The European Convention on Human Rights," 5 World Aff. 435 (1951);
Myers, "Human Rights in Europe," 48 Am. 3. Int. L. 299 (1954); Robertson, "The
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights," 28 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 363
(1951); Triska, "The Individual and His Rights in the European Community, An Ex-
periment in International Law," 31 Tul. L.R. 283 (1957). See also, Jenks, The
Common Law of Mankind (1958); Moskowitz, Human Rights (1958). The statement
of basic rights in the European Convention should be compared with the report of the
Seminar convened by the United Nations Economic and Social Council's Commission
on Human Rights to consider rights deemed basic in Far Eastern Countries (E/CN-
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We shall adopt this approach and attempt to compare some of
the fundamental concepts of American criminal procedure with the
basic concepts in the criminal procedure of civil law countries. As a
rule, the French Code of Criminal Procedure' 7 will be utilized as an
example. Significant variations in the procedure of other civil law
countries will occasionally be pointed out."8
4/765, March 5, 1958) and the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the
United Nations" (1948).
17 Code d'instruction criminelle (1958).
I8 More detailed treatment of the criminal procedure of individual civil law
countries may be found in numerous sources: In General: Esmein, History of Con-
tinental Criminal Procedure (1913); Haimson and Plucknett, The English Trial and
Comparative Law (1952); Calamandrei, Procedure and Democracy (1956); Ploscowe,
"The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedure in Europe and America," 48
Harv. L.R. 433 (1935); Ploscowe, "The Investigating Magistrate in European Criminal
Procedure," 33 Mich. L.R. 1010 (1935); Ploscowe, "Measures of Constraint in European
and Anglo-American Criminal Procedure," 23 Geo. L.J. 762 (1935); Berg, "Criminal
Procedure, France, England, United States," 8 DePaul L.R. 256 (1959); Ploscowe,
"Expert Witnesses in Criminal Cases in France, Germany, and Italy," 2 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 504 (1935); Razi, "Around The World's Legal Systems," 6 How. L.J. 1 (1960);
Schwenk, "Comparative Study of the Law of Criminal Procedure in NATO Countries
Under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement," 35 N.C. L.R. 358 (1957); Biggs,
"Procedure For Handling Mentally Ill Offenders In Some European Countries," 29
Temp. L.Q. 254 (1956); Symposium: "Conditional Release Pending Trial," 108 U. of
Pa. L.R. 290 (1960).
China: Wang, "Chinese and American Criminal Law," 46 J. Crim. L. 796 (1956).
France: Devlin, "English and French Legal Methods: Crime," 4 Int. & Comp.
L.Q. 376 (1955); Freed, "Aspects of French Criminal Procedure," 17 La. L.R. 730
(1957); Haimson, "The Prosecution of the Accused-English and French Legal Meth-
ods," 1955 Crim. L.R. 272; Hauser, "Criminal Law in France," 45 A.B.A. J. 807
(1959); Howard, "Compensation in French Criminal Procedure," 21 Mod. L.J. 387
(1958) ; Keedy, "The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France," 88 U. of Pa. L.R.
386, 692, 915 (1940) ; Patey, "Recent Reforms in French Criminal Law and Procedure,"
9 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 383 (1960); Ploscowe, "Jury Trials in France," 29 Minn. L.R. 376
(1945); Ploscowe, "Administration of Criminal Justice in France," 24 J. Crim. L. 24
(1933); Ploscowe, "Development of Inquisitorial and Accusatorial Elements in French
Criminal Procedure," 23 J. Crim. L. 372 (1932); Vouin, "Protection of the Accused in
French Criminal Procedure," 5 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 1, 157 (1956); Wright, "French
Criminal Procedure," 44 L.Q. Rev. 324 (1928); Wright, "French Criminal Procedure,"
45 L.Q. Rev. 92 (1929).
Germany: An excellent summary may be found in the War Office of the United
Kingdom's "Manual of German Law" (1952). Eichler, "German Criminal Jurisdiction,"
5 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 542 (1956); Meyer, "German Criminal Procedure, The Position
of the Defendant in Court," 41 A.B.A. J. 592 (1955); Sweigert, "Legal System of
Federal Republic of Germany," 11 Hastings L.R. 7 (1959).
Israel: Shoham, "Sentencing Policy of Criminal Courts in Israel," 50 J. Crim. L.
327 (1959).
Japan: Abe, "Criminal Procedure in Japan," 48 J. Crim. L. 359 (1957); Abe,
"Self-Incrimination, Japan and the United States," 46 J. Crim. L. 613 (1956); Meyers,
"The Japanese Inquest of Prosecution," 64 Harv. L.R. 279 (1950); Appleton, "Reforms
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A discussion of the law of the nations of the Communist bloc
has been omitted. This has been done for several reasons. Although
the laws of these nations are civil law in their origin, the authors are
unable to evaluate to what extent the provisions of law are followed
in practice. The impact of Communist ideology upon a traditional
civil law system has been noted by one astute observer.19 In the
second place, the tradition of the bar at least in Soviet Russia is
such that many formal provisions of the Code are of questionable
effectiveness. The third reason is that neither of the authors is fluent
in the languages of the Soviet bloc nations. The analysis of the law
in these countries must be left to other writers °
Even a general study of the criminal procedure of a foreign
nation gives rise to significant difficulties. Initially the problem of
terminology must be overcome. The phrase "due process" may not be
used at all, but the enumeration of individual rights may in combina-
tion add up to the equivalent of due process. In many cases, the
rights may not be enumerated in the constitution itself but in the code
of criminal procedure. If the rights are enumerated in the code but
not in the constitution, under circumstances where history and tradi-
tion regard them as a permanent part of the law, should not they be
regarded as elements of "due process" to the same extent as if they
were formally expressed in the constitution? Sometimes there may
be no written enunciation of a due process clause at all, but an
unwritten tradition permits the conclusion that due process does
exist. Few would question the existence of a constitutional concept
of due process in the United Kingdom despite the absence of any
document expounding the principle.2 '
Perhaps the most difficult problem exists when the language of
the foreign law is the same as that found in American law. Assuming
that due process of law is required, does due process mean the same
to the foreign lawyer and judge as it does to his American counter-
in Japanese Criminal Procedure under Allied Occupation," 24 Wash. L.R. 401 (1949).
In addition to these sources, reference should be made to the "country law studies"
of the criminal procedures of the NATO countries and Japan prepared by the United
States Army, Air Force and Navy.
19 Nemes, "Hungarian Law of Criminal Procedure In the Light of the Mindzenti
Trial," 17 Jurist 157 (1957).
20 Semmes, "Justice Behind the Iron Curtain: Polish Lawyers Fight for the
Criminally Accused," 43 A.B.A. J. 697 (1957); Kiralfy, "The Rule of Law in Com-
munist Europe," 8 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 465 (1959); Brinkley, "The Rule of Law: The
New Soviet Criminal Procedure," 46 A.B.A. J. 637 (1960); Grzybowski, "Soviet
Criminal Law, Reform of 1958," 35 Ind. L.J. 125 (1960).
21 As Justice Jackson pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Shaughnessy v.
United States, ex rel. Mezzei, 345 U.S. 206, 223-224 (1953), with the British, "due process
is a habit, if not a written constitutional dictum."
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part? Particularly where the meaning of due process is being deter-
mined inductively by combining the individual rights enumerated, the
student must be careful that "the right to counsel," "confrontation,"
etc., mean the same in a foreign code as in an American code.
Another important limitation must be noted. Even assuming an
understanding of what due process means in our law and what it or
its equivalent means in the law of a foreign nation can be ascertained,
a further basis of comparison must be used. Any analysis must be in-
complete without a consideration of how these provisions work in
practice. It is one thing to know that due process requires that the
judge who has the duty to determine guilt should not be paid from
fines.22 Such knowledge is incomplete, however, unless one knows
whether states still utilize such a procedure. 3 Study of the law in
action in the criminal courts of the United States often reveals a wide
divergence between what the law provides and what actually occurs.24
The same is true in other countries. Yet the importance of due pro-
cess rests in the rights which a citizen receives, not the rights which
a constitution or statute says he should receive. Such factors as the
traditions of the bar and the integrity of the police may be more
important than a grandiose statement of the rights of an accused in
the constitution. Unfortunately, an appreciation of these factors
requires intensive personal observation of the bench, bar, and actual
court proceedings. Such a study is now being conducted in the United
States by the American Bar Association.25 Our personal observations
have been confined to the United States, Germany, Italy, France,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom.20
One further observation should be made. The student should
not hasten to the conclusion that, because differences are found to
exist between the procedures of two nations, that necessarily means-
or even probably means-a different result will be reached in a
criminal prosecution by one sovereign rather than by the other. It
22 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
23 See Lee, "The Emergence and Evolution of a Constitutional Right to a Fair
Trial Before a Justice of the Peace," 20 Fed. B.J. 111 (1960).
24 See Institute of Legal Research, University of Pennsylvania Law School, "A
Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City (1958)," reprinted in 106 U. Pa.
L.R. 685 (1958).
25 See American Bar Foundation, "Plan for Survey [of the Administration of
Criminal Justice in the United States]" (1955); National Commission on Law Ob-
servance and Enforcement, "Report on Criminal Procedure" (1931).
26 Our observations in the European countries are summarized in "Report of the
Actual Operation of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement" (1956);
and in "Status of Forces Agreements: Criminal Jurisdiction" (1957).
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has been pointed out by a distinguished authority 7 that the result
in any trial depends upon the application of a principle of law to
facts found to be true through the use of a particular procedure. The
substantive law may differ or the procedure may differ. However,
all systems have in common the fact that human beings must deter-
mine what the facts are and apply the principles to these facts. Human
beings as a rule seek to achieve a just result, whatever their nation-
ality. Often this human equation will occasion similar results in the
sense of acquittals or convictions where an academic comparison of
the substantive and procedural law would have revealed considerable
differences.
These factors, the difficulty in determining our law, the difficulty
in ascertaining foreign law, the difference between the law in the
books and the law as it is applied to accused in the courts, and the
effect of the human equation-all conspire to prevent any definite
findings or conclusions. What is sought is insight into the concept of
due process of law and an appreciation of the possible effects upon a
defendant which may result from differing views of what rights are
fundamental.
We shall first consider those procedures and rights which are
required by the due process clause in an American criminal proceed-
ing. We shall also consider some of the rights which although not
required to be afforded an accused by the due process clause are
nevertheless considered characteristic American criminal procedure.
Finally, we shall consider some of the rights which are considered
basic in the procedure of civil law countries but which are considered
of less importance in the United States.
DEFINITE STANDARD OF GUILT
A primary requisite for due process of law in a criminal pros-
ecution is that the statute alleged to be violated must set forth a
specific and definite standard of guilt. A penal statute creating a new
offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to it just
what conduct will render them liable to its penalties; and a statute
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act, in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, is repugnant to due process.28
Though this principle is not generally stated in express terms,
its substance is part of the civil law jurisprudence. In civil law, the
27 Frank, "Civil Law Influences on the Common Law--Some Reflections on 'Com-
parative' and 'Contrastive' Law," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 887, 896-910 (1956).
28 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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maxim, Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege,29 is sacrosanct. This
fundamental principle is reinforced by another: Poenalia sunt re-
stringenda. If there exists any doubt as to the meaning or the exten-
sion of a statute to certain activities, this doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused, and any extension by analogy is forbidden."
The approach, however, differs from that taken by the Supreme
Court in the Lanzetta case. There, the Court struck down a convic-
tion obtained under a vague and indefinite statute, without consider-
ing whether Lanzetta's activities could have been prosecuted under a
more precise statute.31 A civil law court would, we think, be more
likely to consider whether the activity of the accused fell within the
definition of the acts prohibited by the statute and was within the
intent of the legislature. In such case, the civil law court would
punish the accused, leaving to future determination the question of
innocent activity which fell within the wording of the statuteY2
Ex POST FACTO LAWS-RETROACTIVITY OF PENAL LAW
In the United States, the constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws on either the federal33 or the state34 level has made it
unnecessary for the courts to consider such laws in the light of the
due process clause of either the fifth or fourteenth amendments. The
general repugnance to such laws throughout the civilized world is,
29 The provision to this effect is usually found at the beginning of the penal codes
of civil law countries, e.g., art. 4 of the Code penal of France. See art. 7 of the European
Convention:
(1) No one shall be guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a criminal offense under national or international law at
the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than
the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed.
(2) This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according
to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
30 See Bouzat, Trait de droit penal, § 68 (1951). A significant, although tempo-
rary deviation from this principle was found in laws of Nazi Germany which did punish
offenses by analogy. Hall, "Nulla Poena Sine Lege," 47 Yale L.J. 165 (1937); Schwenck,
"Criminal Codification and General Principles of Criminal Law in Germany and the
United States--A Comparative Study," 15 Tul. L.R. 541 (1941); Note, "The Use of
Analogy in Criminal Law," 47 Col. L.R. 613 (1947). It may be argued persuasively
that certain states of the United States violate at least the spirit of this prohibition in
prosecutions for common law misdemeanors. For an article defending the concept of
the common law misdemeanor, see Kline and Hitchler, "Common Law Misdemeanor
Doctrine," 59 Dick. L.R. 343 (1955).
31 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
32 Cf. People of the State of New York ex rel Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152
(1907).
33 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
34 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
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however, the clearest indication that such laws violate a fundamental
right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'35 By dictum in an
early case36 the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws includes the
following:
(a) laws which make an action done before the passing of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal;
(b) laws that aggravate a crime or make it greater than it was
when committed;
(c) laws that change the punishment and inflict a greater punish-
ment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
and
(d) laws that alter the legal rules of evidence, and receive less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense, in order to convict the
offender.T
In the civil law jurisprudence the phrase "ex post facto law"
is not generally used-possibly because of the dubious nature of its
Latinity. Equivalent concepts are, however, expressed in the civil
law penal codes. Thus, the French code is quite explicit: "No petty
offense, no misdemeanor, no felony can be punished with penalties
which have not been established by law prior to the time they were
committed. ' 38 There is no doubt that this provision of the French
code bars prosecution under laws of the first two kinds enumerated
in Calder v. Bull; it would also bar prosecution under a law of the
third type, since an increase in penalty raises the grade of the of-
fense. 9 On the other hand, laws which change the competence of
courts or introduce procedural reforms are given retroactive effect,
the one exception being a law which would, if applied retroactively,
deprive an accused of an appellate remedy to which he was formerly
entitled.
French jurisprudence, moreover, generally gives retroactive effect
to penal laws whenever this will benefit the accused or convicted per-
son.40 A conviction will not be sustained under a law which has been
85 The phrase is that of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937).
36 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); see also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384 (1878).
87 This does not include a statute enlarging the class of competent witnesses.
flopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884).
38 Code Penal, art. 4.
89 Id., art. 1.
40 See Bouzat, Traiti de droit penal, §§ 1519-1536 (1951).
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abrogated since the offense was committed. If a new law reduces the
penalty or the grade of an offense, it will be applied retroactively; and
if a new law reduces the period for the running of the statute of limi-
tations, a criminal prosecution may be barred under the new statute
even though it would otherwise be possible under the old law. But
if the new law increased the time for the running of the statute of
limitations, the old law will be applied.4' While these retroactive
effects are certainly not required by a concept of due process, the
civil law countries are generally inclined to give to the accused the
benefit of any change in the law.
Similar provisions against the retroactivity of penal law, unless
more favorable to the accused, are found in other civil law countries.
Thus, under Italian law, "No one may be punished for an act which,
under the law prevailing at the time it was committed, did not con-
stitute an offense."142 Subsequent legislation favorable to the accused
is given retroactive effect." Punishment adjudged under a statute
which is subsequently abrogated is not to be executed.44 The Turkish
Criminal Code43 contains identical provisions.
Interesting divergences from the general practice can, however,
be found, for example, in Denmark. Though the maxim, Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege, is in general followed in Danish juris-
prudence, the Danish Penal Code46 provides that any conduct, though
not specifically denounced, may be punished if it is fully equal to
conduct for which criminal liability is determined by law. The Code
also directs that criminal liability, as well as the measure of sentence,
shall be determined by the criminal law in effect at the time that
sentence is passed, unless this would result in a more severe sentence
than was imposable under the prior legislation.47 In June 1945, the
Danish Parliament enacted two clearly ex post facto laws for the
punishment of acts committed by Danish quislings during World
War II. The death penalty was reestablished for that purpose, pro-
cedural laws were changed, and the right of appeal was restricted.
These laws were, of course, extraordinary enactments politically in-
41 A contrary result has been reached in the United States, United States v. Powers,
307 U.S. 214 (1945), rehearing denied 308 U.S. 631 (1939).
42 Codice di Procedura Penale, art. 2. See also Costituzione delle Repubblica
Italiana, art. 25.
43 Codice di proc. pen., art. 2.
44 Ibid.
45 Turkish Criminal Code, art. 1-2 (English Translation issued by Hq., USAFE,
1 May 1960).
46 Art. 1.
47 Danish Civil Penal Code, § 3, par. 1.
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spired and may be considered deviations from the general principle
against ex post facto laws.4 8
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
A bill of attainder or, where a penalty less than death is decreed,
a bill of pains and penalties is a legislative act which inflicts punish-
ment without a judicial trial. The Constitution of the United States
forbids both the federal government49 and the states"° to inflict crim-
inal penalties in this manner. While the prohibition against bills of
attainder and bills of pains and penalties is the subject of express
provisions in the text of the federal constitution, there can be no doubt
that the infliction of criminal penalties by a political organ of govern-
ment runs counter to deep-rooted concepts of due process in Anglo-
American jurisprudence.
So far as the civil law countries are concerned, the question of
bills of attainder or of pains and penalties can be disposed of with
dispatch. French law, the modern prototype of the civil law systems,
knows nothing of the bill of attainder or bills of pains and penalties.
All criminal process is judicial process. This principle is so strongly
engrained in French jurisprudence that, under the Constitution of
1946, even impeachment of the President of the Republic, although
initiated by the National Assembly, was to be tried by the High Court
of Justice rather than by the assembly.
The European Convention specifically provides that "no one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a
sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this
penalty is provided by law."5' The article which follows makes it
clear that a judicial trial is also required before lesser penalties can
be imposed.52
NOTICE AND PREPARATION
In all federal prosecutions in the United States, the sixth amend-
ment assures to the accused the right "to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation." The indictment or information must
charge the crime with such reasonable certainty that he can make his
defense and protect himself after judgment against another prosecu-
tion for the same offense.53 Cases arising under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment have tended to speak in terms of the
48 Cf. European Convention, art. 7, supra note 29.
49 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; Ex parte Garland, supra note 36.
50 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
51 Art. 2.
52 Art. 6.
53 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544 (1876).
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vagueness or indefiniteness of the statute under which prosecution is
brought, rather than in terms of the right of the accused to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The language used
in these cases, however, would indicate that a vague statute is uncon-
stitutional precisely because it prevents the accused from knowing the
nature and cause of the accusation. 4
A further right, inherent in the due process clauses of both the
fifth and the fourteenth amendments, is adequate time and opportu-
nity for preparation of a defense. Again, these cases are couched in
terms of the right to counsel, but the language of the Court leaves no
doubt that the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense is fun-
damental 0 As with the right to counsel, the extent of the opportu-
nity to prepare the defense seems to depend on the circumstances of
the individual caseY6
Codes of the civil law countries generally contain detailed pro-
visions designed to provide the accused with specific information as
to the charges against him and to afford adequate opportunity for
preparing his defense. Thus, the French Code of Criminal Procedure
requires the investigating magistrate, at the very outset of the hear-
ings, to inform the accused of the charges against him and of his
right to counsel in the preparation of his defense,57 and all documents
must be made available to the accused or his counsel at least twenty-
four hours prior to each hearing." Any failure to observe these re-
quirements nullifies the proceedings and the documents may not be
used against the accused." The accused may at all times communicate
freely with his counsel,6" who must be present at any interrogation or
confrontation of the accused.1 All reports or statements of expert
witnesses are to be made available to the accused,6" and he is to be
informed within twenty-four hours of the decision of the investigat-
ing magistrate whether to dismiss the charges or refer them for trial . 3
Unlike grand jury proceedings in the United States, the French
code provides ample opportunities for notice and representation to
an accused who is charged with a felony before the chambre d'accusa-
tion-the civil counterpart of the common law grand jury. Notice
54 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-510 (1948).
55 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66, 71 (1932).
56 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462-463 (1942).
57 Code d'instr. crim., art. 114 (France).
G8 Id., art. 118.
59 Id., art. 170.
40 Id., art. 116.
01 Id., art. 118.
'02 Id., art. 167.
63 Id., art. 183.
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of such hearings must be given to the accused or his counsel, after
which a minimum of forty-eight hours must elapse before the hear-
ing, if the accused is in detention, and otherwise a minimum of five
days. 4 The accused has the right to file memoranda in his behalf
with the chambre d'accusationI5 which may also in its discretion
allow the accused to appear personally.68 If the chambre d'accusation
orders a supplementary investigation, the file of the proceedings is
to be deposited in the office of the clerk, the parties are to be notified,
and the accused is to have access to this file.67 This file must remain
in the clerk's office for at least forty-eight hours if the accused is in
detention, and otherwise for at least five days.68 Notice of the deci-
sion of the chambre d'accusation must be given to the accused with-
in twenty-four hours. 9
In the trial of felony cases before the cour d'assises, the French
code requires that the accused be notified of the decision of referral
and that a copy thereof be served on him.70 After a preliminary
examination of the accused by the president of the court,71 at least
five days must be given to the accused to prepare his defense before
the start of the trial.72 Meanwhile, and at all times, the accused must
have free access to the files in his case and has the right to communi-
cate freely with his counsel.73 He must be given a free copy of the
procs-verbal containing the statements made by the witnesses against
him in the preliminary investigations.74 He must receive twenty-four
hours' notice of the list of prosecution witnesses75 and forty-eight
hours' notice of the list of jurors,76 evidently with a view to determin-
ing whether any of these latter are to be challenged.77 The French
code also requires notice of the charges and reference to the statute
to be served on the accused in the case of misdemeanors to be tried by
the tribunal correctionnel7 as well as in the case of petty offenses
64 Id., art. 187.
085 Id., art. 158.
06 Id., art. 199.
87 Id., art. 208.
68 Id., art. 209.
69 Id., art. 217.
70 Id., art. 268.
71 Id., art. 272.
72 Id., art. 277.
73 Id., art. 278.
74 Id., art. 279.
75 Id., art. 281.
76 Id., art. 282.
77 For challenge to jury, see Code d'instr. crim., art. 297-301 (France).
78 Id., art. 389.
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to be tried by a single magistrate.79 While misdemeanors detected
flagrante delicto may be brought to trial without delay, 0 the court
must inform the accused of his right to request a continuance; and if
such request is made, at least three days must elapse before the case
may be brought to trial."'
The civil law system, as exemplified by the French code, makes
ample provision for notice to the accused of the specific offense
charged against him and affords adequate opportunity for preparing
his defense. The rationale of these provisions is clearly the convic-
tion that lack of such notice and opportunity would be unfair to an
accused, and the provisions are therefore grounded upon the concept
of due process, even though this phrase is nowhere used in reference
to them. Indeed, it may be said that the French procedure, which
allows access to the pre-trial investigations, gives greater opportunity
for discovery and the preparation of a defense than does the Ameri-
can procedure.
Compare the position of the accused under federal criminal
procedure. He has no right to appear before the grand jury.82 He
has no right to see the grand jury transcript.13 He may inspect the
documents, books, papers, photographs, or other tangible objects in
the hands of the Government only if the objects belonged to him or
were obtained from others by seizure or process."4 In most federal
courts he cannot obtain inspection of his confession.,5 He cannot
obtain inspection of statements of government witnesses before they
take the stand. 0 He has no right to see any memoranda prepared by
government agents as a result of investigating the case.sT He can
ascertain the identity of an informant in an appropriate case. 8 He
has no right even to obtain the name of witnesses whom the Govern-
ment intends to call except in capital cases, and then he may learn
their identity only three days before trial.8 9 It is doubtful if any civil
law country would consider that such a state of law meets the require-
ments of fundamental fairness. American military law is much closer
to the civil law viewpoint, providing free access to the defense.f0
7) Id., art. 532.
80 Id., art. 393.
81 Id., art. 396.
82 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1958).
83 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 6.
84 Ibid.
85 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.
86 Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir., 1955).
87 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
88 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
s9 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
90 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1958).
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ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
By federal statute,9 a person indicted for treason or other capital
offenses in a federal court is entitled to the assistance of counsel for
his defense; and on his request, the court must assign him counsel.
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,92 the court must
assign counsel in all cases, unless the accused expressly waives the
right to counsel or is able to retain counsel. The opinion of the Su-
preme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst93 indicates that these may not be
constitutional, as distinguished from statutory, requirements in all
federal cases. It is clear that the sixth amendment guarantees to an
accused the right to retain counsel of his own choice in all cases. In
view of the decision in Powell v. Alabama,4 based on the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, it would seem that the duty to
assign counsel to indigent defendants at least in capital cases is re-
quired by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, if not by
the provisions of the sixth, since the states cannot be held to a higher
standard than the federal government in such matters. So far as
trials in state courts are concerned, the Powell case clearly requires
the assignment in all capital cases, on due process grounds; and on
the same basis there is a constitutional right to assigned counsel in
other cases where the circumstances are such that the assistance of
counsel is necessary for the preparation and presentation of an ade-
quate defense.9 5 To date, however, the Supreme Court has not made
the assignment of counsel a universal requirement as a matter of due
process9 Certainly in most cases the accused may waive his right
to the assistance of counsel, retained or assigned, provided this is done
intelligently. The trial judge could, of course, refuse to permit such
waiver where he considered the assistance of counsel essential for a
proper defense.
The accused does not have a right to be represented by counsel
during the police investigation 7 Apparently the absolute right to
counsel98 occurs only after indictment, and thus far the Supreme
Court has not required that the states appoint counsel to advise an
91 See Kent, "The Jencks Case-The Viewpoint of a Military Lawyer," 45 A.B.A.
J. 819 (1959).
92 Rule 44.
93 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
94 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
95 Moore v. Michigan, 335 U.S. 155 (1957); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
'96 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
97 Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958). Cf. practice in military law, United States v. Gunnels, 8 USCMA 130, 23
CMR 354 (1957).
98 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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indigent after indictment but before trial. Even the mandate of
the sixth amendment apparently does not require the appointment of
counsel at all stages of the pretrial investigation.99
The civil law codes quite generally provide for the assistance of
counsel in the defense of an accused person.' Thus, the French code
provides that the examining magistrate, at the outset of the pre-
liminary investigation, must explicitly inform the accused of his right
to retain counsel; he must also appoint counsel for the accused, if the
latter so requests' 1 At the preliminary investigations, the accused
may be heard or confronted only in the presence of his counsel. 02
Under the code, these are jurisdictional requirements: failure to ob-
serve them nullifies all subsequent proceedings.0 3 While the accused
may waive these rights, such waiver must be explicit and is to be
made only in the presence of counsel or upon notice to the latter.10 4
Counsel is also required to be present when the seals on real evidence
are removed by the examining magistrate.10
While neither the accused nor his counsel has the right to appear
before the chambre d'accusation (any more than in the United States
they would have the right to appear before a grand jury), nevertheless
the petitions of the prosecution to the chambre are to be made avail-
able to the accused or his counsel, 1 6 and the accused is entitled, pro se
or through his counsel, to submit to the chambre such memoranda as
he may wish.0 7
99 Apparently there is no obligation to appoint counsel for an indigent for a
preliminary examination under Rule 5(b) or on a hearing before a Commissioner
upon a warrant of removal under Rule 40(b): Hall and Glueck, Cases on Criminal
Law, 605 (1958). It may be doubted whether the Supreme Court would have decided
Crooker and Cicenia the same way if the cases had arisen under the sixth amendment.
100 The European Convention provides in art. 6(3) (c) that everyone charged with
a criminal offense has the right "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be
given it free when the interests of justice so require."
101 Code d'inst. crim., art. 114 (France).
102 Id., art. 118.
103 Id., art. 17.
104 Ibid.
105 Id., art. 97.
10 Id., art. 197.
107 Id., art. 198. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (1958): "Whoever attempts to influence
the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States
upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a
member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communi-
cation, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $100O or
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a
request to appear before the grand jury."
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In felony cases, tried before the cour d'assises, the accused is to
be requested to select counsel, and if he does not do so, the president
of the court is required to appoint counsel for him. 08 The accused
is to be free at all times to communicate with his counsel,"° whose
presence at the trial is compulsory."' In misdemeanor cases, tried be-
fore the tribunal correctionnel, the accused is likewise entitled to
counsel, and the court must appoint counsel for him if he so re-
quests.:"' The assistance of counsel in misdemeanor cases is compul-
sory when the court grants the defendant's request that the trial pro-
ceed in his absence, 112 and also whenever the court determines that
the assistance of counsel is necessary for an adequate defense."
Communications between the accused and his counsel are privileged
and may not be admitted in evidence against the accused." 4 In trials
for petty offenses before a single magistrate, the accused is entitled to
retain counsel, but there seems to be no requirement that counsel be
appointed for him by the court.
Under French law, therefore, the accused is entitled to be assisted
by counsel of his own choice in all cases, as in American law. At his
request, the examining magistrate and the trial court must appoint
counsel for the accused, with the apparent exception of the trial of
petty offenses. The due process concept which underlies these pro-
visions, based on the philosophy that adequate defense of the accused
requires assistance of expert counsel, is evidenced by the requirement
that counsel shall be either barristers or solicitors,115 as well as by the
provision that counsel shall be appointed, despite waiver by the
accused, in all felony cases"" and whenever the absence of counsel
would tend to compromise the defense." 7
Provisions for representation by counsel under French law are
more extensive than generally found in the law of other countries. In
Italy, for instance, while counsel will be appointed for an accused if
he has not selected counsel,1 ' the counsel does not have the right to
108 Code d'instr. crim., art. 274 (France).
109 Id, art. 278.
110 Id., art. 317.
"1 Id., art. 411.
112 Id., art. 411.
113 Id., art. 417.
114 Id., art. 432. The same rule seems to exist in trials for petty offenses before
United States Commissioners. See "Rules for Trial of Petty Offenses before United
States Commissioners," Rule 2.
115 Code d'instr. crim., art. 114, 275, 417. By way of exception, the accused may
be permitted to take a relative or friend as his counsel. Id., art. 275.
116 Id., art. 275.
17 Id., art. 417; CI. art. 411.
118 Codice di procedura penale, art. 304, 366.
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actually represent the accused before the judge of instruction." 9 The
absence of this right has been severely criticized by an outstanding
Italian authority.
20
In Ireland apparently there is no provision for providing counsel
for indigents.'21
PRESENCE OF ACCUSED AT TRIAL
In the United States, it has been stated that an accused has the
right to be present at his trial whenever his presence bears a reason-
able relationship to the opportunity to present a complete and full
defense. 2 This does necessarily include the right to be present at a
viewing, by the jury, of the scene of the crime. 23  Although the
question does not seem to have been the subject of constitutional ad-
judication, it is a general principle of American jurisprudence that in
the case of a felony there can be no trial on the merits in the absence
of the defendant.2 4 In some states, trial for misdemeanor may pro-
ceed in the voluntary absence of the defendant, provided the court
has acquired jurisdiction. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 121 in non-capital cases the defendant's voluntary absence
after the trial has begun in his presence does not preclude the trial
from proceeding up to and including the return of the verdict.
The codes of civil law countries quite generally provide for the
trial of an accused in absentia under certain circumstances. At the
same time, they universally allow the accused to be present at his
trial if he so wishes, except in unusual circumstances such as unruly
conduct. 26 Where, however, his absence is voluntary, the French
code for example, makes provision for trial of the case in his absence
and for judgment by default or by contumacy. Before these trials in
absentia, so alien to the traditions of Anglo-American jurisprudence,
can be evaluated from the viewpoint of due process, it will be neces-
sary to consider in some detail the provisions of the French code.
Contumacy. When a person indicted for felony has not been
119 He does have the right to assist in the interrogation of the accused, be present
at a reconstruction of the crime, the examination of experts, and at identifications.
Id., art. 135, 309-bis. Cf. Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1960).
120 Calamendrei, Procedure and Democracy, 93, 94, 102, 103 (1956).
121 The exact provisions of Irish law are not clear to us. However, Ireland filed
a reservation against that part of article 6(c) of the European Convention, supra
note 100, which provided for the appointment of counsel for indigents on the ground
that it was contrary to existing law.
122 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
123 Ibid.
VI See 5 Wharton, Crime, Law and Proc. § 2007 (12th ed. 1957).
125 Rule 43.
126 Code d'instr. crim., art. 322 (France).
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arrested or does not appear in response to a summons to trial, or
when he escapes after such arrest or appearance, the cour d'assises
issues a new order that he appear for trial within ten days or be
declared contumacious, 127 and this order is to be published in his place
of domicile. 2 8 Upon his continued failure to appear, the court pro-
ceeds to undertake a judgment of contumacy,1 29 at which the accused
may not be represented by counsel. His relatives or friends may, how-
ever, present excusing causes to the court on his behalf, 30 and the
court, if it finds legitimate excuse for the non-appearance of accused,
will order a stay of the contumacy proceedings so long as the excuse
continues valid.' 3 ' In the absence of such excuse, the court, sitting
without a jury, considers the felony accusation on its merits.'32 A
conviction of the contumaceous accused is equivalent to a conviction
of the felony charged, he loses his civic rights, and his property is
sequestered. 33 If, however, the person convicted by proceedings in
contumacy surrenders or is arrested before the statute of limitations
has run, the conviction is quashed and the case is tried again on the
merits and in his presence; and restitution is made of his sequestered
property.1
Default. An analogous procedure, called judgment by default,
is followed in the case of misdemeanors in the tribunal correctional
and of petty offenses tried before a single magistrate. Before a judg-
ment by default can be rendered against an absent defendant, it must
be established either that he was personally served with a summons or
that he had actual knowledge of service by publication. 135 As in the
case of contumacy, a judgment by default may be reopened by the
defaulter within a specified time after he receives notice of the judg-
ment or, if no such notice is received, then before the statute of limi-
tations has run,'36 and in such case, the charges against him are tried
de novo on the merits and in his presence.
Once the statute of limitations has run,3 7 a sentence of fine or
127 Id., art. 627.
128 Id., art. 628.
129 Id., art. 629.
130 Id., art. 630.
131 Id., art. 631.
132 Id., art. 632.
133 Id., art. 627.
134 Id., art. 639.
135 Id., art. 410, 412.
136 id., art. 491-492.
137 The statute of limitations is ten years for felonies, three years for misde-
meanors, and one year for petty offenses. The statute begins to run on the date of the
offense, if there has been no investigation or prosecution in the meantime. Code d'instr.
crim., art. 7-9.
[Vol. 21
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
imprisonment which has been imposed by judgment of contumacy or
default can no longer be executed. On the other hand, if there has
been a judgment of contumacy, the property of the contumaceous
person remains sequestered, and an account thereof is given to the
person entitled to receive it, once the conviction has become irrevo-
cable by the lapse of the terms given to him to surrender himself-
i.e., once the statute of limitations has run.38
Excused Absence. In the case of offenses punishable by fine or
by imprisonment for less than two years, the accused may request that
the trial be conducted in his absence by the tribunal correctionnel,
and in such case his counsel appears for the accused. 39 In the case
of petty offenses punishable by fine only, the accused may elect to pay
the fine in settlement of the case.' 4 Such payment is regarded as
an admission of guilt, and there are no further criminal proceedings.' 4'
What is to be said of trials in absentia from the viewpoint of due
process? Historically, the common law requirement of the defendant's
presence at a criminal trial-or at least at the start of the trial,
followed by his voluntary absence-traces, as does the requirement
of service in civil cases,1 42 to the concept of physical power to enforce
judgment as the sole basis for jurisdiction. The requirement is, how-
ever, so deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal tradition and is such
an obvious protection against the abuses of outlawry in the old com-
mon law,'43 that it would doubtless on that basis be held to be de-
manded by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, should the question ever arise.' 44
It may be queried, however, whether the civil law practice of
trials in absentia is contrary to a broader concept of due process-
whether the practice is inherently and fundamentally unfair. 4 5 The
requirements of actual notice and the admission of excusing causes, as
13S Code d'instr. crim., art. 633.
139 Id., art. 411.
140 Id., art. 524.
141 Id., art. 525.
142 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
143 For what is apparently the only American case of conviction outlawry and a
liscussion of the subject, see Respublica v. Doan, 1 U.S. (1 Dal].) 86 (1784).
144 Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) sustaining a conviction
'or contempt as "sui generis" and not "a criminal prosecution."
145 It may be questioned whether there is any substantial difference between
,emitting a court to enter a judgment for monetary damages against a domiciliary
-rved with process outside of the state (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1941)); or
gainst a non-resident automobile driven where process is served on a state official with
letter sent to the defendant outside of the state (Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
1927)) and a criminal judgment of a fine imposed upon a defendant who was notified
! the charge and refused to appear although given an opportunity to do so.
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well as the possibility of a new trial de novo and the non-enforceability
of judgment after a certain period, all seem to be predicated upon con-
cepts of due process in the more universal sense of the term and at the
same time effectively preclude any substantial prejudice to the
accused by reason of a trial during his voluntary absence.
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
The sixth amendment to the Constitution guarantees to an
accused the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' 45
The precise scope of this guarantee, as well as the extent to which it
applies to state prosecutions via the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, is the subject of some doubt. 47
However, the right to confrontation does not mean that in all
cases testimony is inadmissible unless given in court in the presence
of the defendant. The Supreme Court has recognized that in some
circumstances the right of the accused must give way to consider-
ations of public policy and the necessities of the case. 148 State statutes
permitting depositions to be admitted where it is impossible or im-
practicable to produce the witness at trial have been sustained against
attacks upon the ground that they violated the due process clause.149
And it is clear that in a court-martial the right to confrontation is not
quite so broad as it generally is in federal civilian courts."
Nor does the confrontation requirement, at least under the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause, mean the constitutional
canonization of all the common law rules on the exclusion of hearsay
evidence. In Stein v. New York,' 5' the Supreme Court stated flatly:
"The hearsay-evidence rule, with all its subtleties, anomalies and rami-
140 U.S. Const., amend. VI; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Motes
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
147 See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
148 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-244 (1895). However, Rule 36 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that in all trials the testimony of a
witness shall be taken orally in open court unless otherwise provided by an act of
Congress or the court rules. No statute or rule permits the Government to utilize
depositions.
149 West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Haynes v. People, 128 Colo. 565,
265 P.2d 995 (1954); People v. Fish, 125 N.Y. 136, 26 N.E. 319 (1891); Harrison v.
State, 112 Ohio St. 429, 147 N.E. 650 (1925), aff'd, 270 U.S. 632 (1926); State ex rel.
Drew v. Shaughnessy, 212 Wis. 322, 249 N.W. 522 (1933).
150 Under United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960),
deposition may be admissible if the accused was afforded the right to be present am
to be represented by qualified counsel at its taking. Prior to this decision a depositioi
was admissible even though the accused was not afforded the right to be preseni
United States v. Sutton, 3 USCMA 220, 11 CM 220 (1953); United States v. Parrist
7 USCMA 337, 22 CMR 127 (1956).
151 Stein v. People of State of New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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fications, will not be read into the Fourteenth Amendment." The same
principle is doubtless, to some extent at least, applicable to the right
of confrontation under the sixth amendment.
152
It seems clear that "confrontation" in the American consti-
tutional sense means something more than the physical co-presence
of defendant and witness at the time the latter's testimony is taken.
The main objective embodied within the right of confrontation in the
constitutional sense is to secure to the accused the right of cross-
examination, and the secondary or subordinate objective is to permit
the triers of fact to observe the demeanor and assess the credibility
of a witness. 153 Dean Wigmore has pointed out: 154
There never was at common law any recognized right to an indis-
pensable thing called Confrontation as distinguished from Cross-
Examination. There was a right to cross-examination as indispen-
sable, and that right was involved in and secured by confrontation,
it was the same right under different names .... It follows that,
if the accused has had the benefit of cross-examination, he has had
the very privilege secured to him by the Constitution.
Dean Wigmore also points out 15 that this is not a right without ex-
ceptions, for the simple reason that the hearsay rule has always ad-
mitted of exceptions and that further exceptions may be created in
the future.
It should also be noted that, in the United States, the right of
confrontation or cross-examination has never been extended to the
testimony of witnesses before a grand jury,'56 nor to the preliminary
interrogation of prospective witnesses by a prosecuting attorney. The
furthest step in this direction seems to be the right granted to an
accused person to interrogate witnesses at the preliminary examina-
tion which precedes the referral of charges for trial by court-
martial. 57
In the civil law systems generally, the preliminary testimony of
witnesses is taken by the examining magistrate outside the presence
of the accused or his counsel.' They are afterwards required to
repeat their testimony in his presence. This is the process which is
152 However, the Supreme Court has pointed out recently that it regards con-
frontation as "fundamental" and that it has been "zealous" to protect it not only in
criminal cases but in all types of cases where administrative or regulatory action has
been under scrutiny. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
153 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
154 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1397 (3d ed. 1940).
155 Ibid.
156 Indeed, hearsay may be the basis for an indictment. See Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
'57 UCMJ, art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1958 ed.).
158 See Code d'instr. crim., art. 102 (France).
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called confrontation, at which counsel for the accused may be present
but has no right of cross-examinations. The failure to provide the
opportunity for cross-examination at this preliminary investigation
parallels the lack of opportunity for cross-examination before the
common law grand jury-with one important difference. The file
which is compiled as a result of this preliminary investigation is avail-
able to the court prior to the subsequent trial; and, in the case of petty
offenses tried by a single magistrate, this file may form the sole basis
for judgment, unless the accused himself wishes witnesses either for
or against him to be recalled to testify at the trial. At the trial of
felonies and misdemeanors, however, the court is to base its decision
only on proof brought to him during the trial and discussed before
him in the presence of both parties,'59 and, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, the procas-verbal and the reports establishing offenses
have the value only of mere information. 160
In the civil law procedure, however, there is not the right of
cross-examination which the common law deems so essential. In the
trial of a felony before the cour d'assises, the prosecutor may question
the witnesses directly, but counsel for the accused must propose his
questions to the president to be asked of the witness,'"' and the same
is true in the trial of misdemeanor cases before the tribunal correc-
tionnel.'6 The president of the court may refuse to ask the requested
questions, but an objection may be made to his refusal, and this may
serve as the basis for an appeal.
From the foregoing it is clear that "confrontation" has quite a
different meaning in a civil law system from its signification in Ameri-
can constitutional law.163 And if, within a civil law system, the denial
of the right of cross-examination has the same effect as it would have
in our common law procedure, then it is clear that a substantial right
of an accused would be lacking.
Such would not seem, however, on closer analysis to be the case.
In comparing the requirements of "confrontation" in the common law
system and in the civil law, it is important to remember that in both
systems of jurisprudence the sole purpose of a trial is to arrive at the
truth, to protect society while safeguarding the rights of the accused.
159 Id., art. 427.
160 Id., art. 430.
161 Id., art. 332.
162 Id., art. 454.
103 It is perhaps significant that the word "confrontation" is not used in the Euro-
pean Convention. That Convention does however grant to an accused the right "to
examine or have examined witnesses against him" article 6(3) (d). The term "con-
frontation" is used in article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 4 UST
1792, TIAS 2946, 199 UNTS 67 (1951).
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They part company only where there is question of the best means
of attaining that purpose. In the common law concept, the judge acts
as the arbiter between two opponents, each represented by his legal
champion. The law assumes that each opponent is adequately repre-
sented by counsel and leaves it to each of them to adduce the testi-
mony most favorable to his side and to impugn adverse testimony.'
The judge sits to see that the rules of the contest are observed by both
sides; and in this adversary proceeding, the right of cross-examination
is naturally the primary constituent of the right of confrontation. In
the civil law system, however, the proceeding is not deemed to be
primarily adversary in nature. The judge plays a more active role,
and it is not left to the prosecution and to the defense to adduce evi-
dence which is favorable to their respective sides and to impugn ad-
verse evidence. Indeed, the prosecutor himself has the obligation to
bring out evidence favorable to the accused. Here, as a result, con-
frontation is not regarded as essentially including the right to cross-
examination. With this difference in mind, it is difficult to assert
categorically that the lack of cross-examination in the civil law sub-
stantially prejudices the accused or, in context, runs counter to con-
cepts of due process of law and fundamental fairness.
COMPULSORY PROCESS
The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides that an ac-
cused is entitled to "have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor." The question of compulsory process seems not to have
been the subject of constitutional adjudication, either under the sixth
or fourteenth amendment, at least not in the federal courts. It is
clear that the constitutional right refers only to witnesses who are in
some way subject to the jurisdiction of the sovereign prosecuting the
case.' Compulsory process is universally available in the state
courts, and the provisions of the "Uniform Act to Secure the Attend-
ance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Proceedings,"'06
have expanded the powers of the states in this regard.
In France, as in the civil law systems generally, the decision to
summon and hear witnesses during the preliminary examination is
primarily the function of the examining magistrate.'6 7 Both the
164 In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949), Justice Frankfurter pointed out
that "ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system."
105 Baker v. People, 72 Colo. 68, 209 Pac. 791 (1922). An interesting facet of
this problem occurs in the case of an American court-martial sitting outside the United
States, where there is a need for foreign witnesses. See United States v. De Angelis,
3 USCMA 298, 12 CMR 54 (1953).
166 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 41.
167 Code d'instr. crim., art. 101.
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prosecution and the accused may request that certain witnesses be
called, and the examining magistrate has compulsory process for that
purpose,"' but the final decision in this matter rests with the magis-
trate. This is analogous to the procedure before an American grand
jury, except that in the United States it is usually the prosecution
which determines what witnesses shall be summoned before the grand
jury, no similar right being accorded to the accused. In this regard,
the American practice gives to the prosecution an advantage which
it does not have in the civil law.
At trial, both prosecution and defense have an equal right to
summon witnesses,' 69 for whose attendance compulsory process will
issue from the court.170 Normally, the expense of summoning defense
witnesses is borne by the accused, except that the public prosecutor
may cause defense witnesses to be summoned at public expense, if he
deems their statements necessary to establish the truth.17'
Compulsory process to obtain defense witnesses is so essential
to the concept of due process that the question seems not to have been
ever raised in American courts. 7 1 It would seem that the statutory
provisions in the French code adequately meet the test and are based
on the concept of due process.
BURDEN OF PROOF-RESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the burden of proof is on the
government in all criminal cases. The defendant is not required posi-
tively to prove his innocence. In the United States, as another state-
ment-or perhaps a corollary-of the same principle, frequent refer-
ence is made to the "presumption of innocence" which clothes the
accused in a criminal case. While this is not a true presumption or a
rule of evidence, 73 it is a well-established maxim of American juris-
prudence. It means in essence that the prosecution has the burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The requirement of reason-
able doubt has received perhaps its best definition by Chief Justice
Shaw in Commonwealth v. Webster:174
168 Id., art. 109.
109 Id., art. 281.
170 Id., art. 324, 326.
171 Id., art. 281.
172 Cf. State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Ore. 163, 269 P.2d 491 (1954), in
which the court required the state to produce a witness for the defense over the state's
objection that the deposition of the witness would be an adequate substitute.
173 9 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2511 (3d ed. 1940). See Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152,
4 So. 2d 887 (1941). See also the lucid discussion of this question in McCormick,
Evidence, 647-649 (1954).
174 5 Cush. 295, 320 (Mass. 1850). See also the discussion in 9 Wigmore, Evi-
dence, § 2497 (3d ed. 1940) and the cases there cited.
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[Reasonable doubt] is that state of the case which, after the
entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say that they
feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
fact to a reasonable and moral certainty,--a certainty that con-
vinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and
judgment. . . . This we take to be proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The requirement places on the prosecution the burden of sub-
mitting to the jury such evidence which, if believed by the jury, estab-
lishes each element of the crime and the fact that it was committed
by the accused-and this beyond a reasonable doubt. There are,
therefore, two requirements: (1) the prosecution must prove to the
jury each element of the offense" and the fact of its commission by
the defendant; and (2) the jury must have moral certitude, since
only such certitude excludes all reasonable doubt.
Since the civil law codes and authors do not generally speak in
terms of presumption of innocence,'1 76 burden of proof or reasonable
doubt, we must in this context have recourse to the general principles
of the civil law jurisprudence, particularly as exemplified in French
law.
Despite a wide-spread belief to the contrary, the maxim that
"the accused is presumed guilty until proved innocent" is completely
unknown to the civil law. Beyond a doubt, there is no presumption
of guilt, and the burden of proof does not lie upon the accused. The
authors know of no such principle in the jurisprudence of any civilized
nation.
On the other hand, the phrase "presumption of innocence" is not
in general use in French jurisprudence. As has been pointed out
above, it is not a true presumption in the technical sense. The absence
of the term from French jurisprudence is also to be explained as a
reaction against the ancient system of "legal proofs" whose probative
value was fixed by law or custom and had to be mechanically applied
by the judges. 7 7 French authors do, however, use the term. Thus one
commentator says of the burden of proof in criminal cases: 178
It is a general principle that in a case it is up to the moving
party to seek out and put forth his proofs; consequently, the bur-
175 An interesting variation from this principle is the rule in almost one half of
our states that the burden of proving insanity as a defense rests on the accused. Amer.
Law Inst., "Model Penal Code" (Tentative Draft No. 4), App. C, § 4.03.
176 Cf., however, article 6(2) of the European Convention which provides that
"Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law."
177 See Bouzat, Trait6 de droit p~nal § 1066 (1951).
178 Id., § 1063 (the translation is ours).
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den of proof in a criminal proceeding lies upon the accuser, i.e.,
upon the public ministry and the civil party.
The situation of the moving party in a civil case and of the
accuser in a penal proceeding is not, however, identical. In fact,
in penal matters, the accused is clothed with a presumption of in-
nocence which constitutes a guarantee of individual liberty. This
presumption (which is available to recidivists as well as to first
offenders) has as its consequence that, in case of any doubt, it is
necessary to decide in favor of the accused (in dubio pro reo).
This means that it makes the task of the penal accuser a heavier
one.
This presumption of innocence has still other consequences:
in case of an attempt, if the beginning of the overt act can be
applied to several infractions of varying gravity, it must be pre-
sumed, in the absence of other proof, that the actor had the inten-
tion of committing the less grave offense; on a vote in the cour
d'assises, ballots which are blank or declared void are counted in
favor of the accused, and a tie brings about a definitive acquittal;
after a conviction in the court of first instance which has not be-
come final, since the presumption of innocence is not destroyed, the
provisional libertr of the convicted person is continued during the
appeal and the review in cassation, as a result of their suspensive
effect.
Besides, while the accused in a penal proceeding has an in-
contestable interest in assisting as best he can to establish causes
of irresponsibility or excusing causes invoked by him, it is no less
certain that it is up to the public ministry to adduce proof him-
self of all the circumstances of the infraction. When, therefore,
an accused invokes, with some appearance of truth, a cause of ir-
responsibility or excusing cause, it is up to the public ministry, if
it wishes to avoid an acquittal, to establish the non-existence of
this cause.
It would be difficult to find a clearer expression of the principle
that in a criminal case the burden of proof rests with the prosecution.
It will be noted that, in French as well as in the majority of American
states, once the accused puts in issue some cause of irresponsibility
(such as insanity), the burden of proving its non-existence (proof of
sanity) rests likewise on the prosecution. 179
Nor does French jurisprudence sanction a finding of guilty in a
criminal case by the mere preponderance of the evidence, as is the case
in civil actions. French jurists do not, however, speak of a "presump-
tion of innocence" or of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Instead,
it is required that the judgment of the court be arrived at by an inner
conviction. Thus, the French code prescribes that, before the cour
d'assises retires to consider its verdict, the president shall read to
them the following instruction:'
179 See note 175, supra.
180 Code d'instr. crim., art. 353 (France) (our translation). See also art. 427, which
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The law does not ask the judges for an account of the means
by which they have become convinced; it does not prescribe rules
on which they shall make the fullness and sufficiency of proof de-
pend; it prescribes that they shall question themselves in silence
and meditation and seek in the sincerity of their conscience to
know what impression the proofs brought against the accused and
for his defense have made upon their reasoning. The law asks them
this question only, which encompasses the full measure of their
duty: "Have you an inner conviction?"
The French law, therefore, requires that the judge or jury must arrive
at a firm interior conviction that the accused is guilty, on the basis
of the evidence presented in the case, before a finding of guilty can
be made.'' We think that this is precisely the "moral certainty"
required by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Webster.8 2 Such
certainty by definition excludes all reasonable doubt. If a reasonable
doubt exists in the mind of judge or juror the maxim, "in dubio pro
reo," is to be applied, and the judge or juror is obliged to vote for
acquittal.
We do not imply that the position of an accused is the same
before a civil law court as before an American court. In American
criminal procedure there is a close relationship between the presump-
tion of innocence and the privilege against self-incrimination. The
accused may choose to remain silent as a practical matter because he
is presumed to be innocent and the jury will be instructed to that
effect. The defense counsel will argue that he is "clothed with the
presumption of innocence" and the jury often is given the impression
that if this "presumption" does not have probative effect, it still con-
stitutes some type of mystical barricade which must be obliterated
before the Government can triumph. 83
When the accused experiences his day in court in France, how-
ever, the atmosphere is different. The President of the court will have
read the dossier and will be familiar with prior statements of the
accused, the witnesses, and the opinions of the juge d'instruction and
requires a judge of the tribunal correctionnel to decide on the basis of his own inner
conviction, and to "base his decision only on proof brought to him during the trial and
discussed before him in the presence of both parties.
181 The concept of "in dubio pro reo" is an essential part of Japanese law: Abe,
"Criminal Procedure in Japan," 43 J. Crim. L. 359, 363 (1957). The same concept is
found in German law: Meyer, "German Criminal Procedure, The Position of the De-
fendant in Court," A.B.A. J. 592, 593-594 (1955). Chinese law requires a "free con-
scientious judgment": Wang, "Chinese and American Criminal Law," 46 J. Crim. L.
796, 799 (1956).
182 5 Cush. 25 (Mass. 1850).
183 Professor McCormick effectively criticizes the misuse of the doctrine. Mc-
Cormick, Evidence, 647-649 (1954).
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the police."" The accused will be expected (although not required)
to present his story at the beginning of the proceeding. If the accused
remains silent, his silence may be made the subject of comment. In
some circumstances, the official reports, proc~s-verbaux, carry with
them a presumption of authenticity. The criminal trial may be joined
with a civil suit for damages. Under these circumstances the doctrine
of the presumption of innocence possibly does not assume the im-
portance to a French accused that it does to his American counter-
part. This is not to say, however, that he will not be acquitted unless
the triers of fact are convinced from the testimony adduced before
them that he is guilty of the offense charged.
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
The right to an "impartial jury" is expressed in the sixth amend-
ment to the Constitution. A fair and impartial court is part and
parcel of the due process of law guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments; indeed, it is probably the most fundamental of all the
rights embraced within that concept. This right precludes trial before
a judge who has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. 8 5
The required impartiality has been held to be lacking whenever judge
or jury are dominated by a mob." 6 The universal common law prac-
tice of allowing challenges for cause and of providing for change of
venue are predicated upon a recognition of the requirement of a fair
and impartial tribunal as essential to due process of law.
Similar provisions for safeguarding the impartiality of the tri-
bunal in criminal cases are found in the civil law systems and are
based implicitly upon the same concept of due process. Thus, the
French code provides that an examining magistrate cannot participate
in the subsequent trial of the same case, under pain of nullity,187 and
provision is made for transfer of the case from one examining magis-
trate to another, for good cause.'88 No person may sit as a judge of
the cour d'assises if he has in the same case previously conducted the
prosecution or investigation, or participated in the decision to indict
184 These factors are discussed in different context in Hauser, "The Criminal Law
in France,"' 45 A.B.A. J. 807, (1959); Vouin, "The Protection of the Accused in French
Criminal Procedure," 5 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 1, 157, (1956); and Howard, "Compensation
in French Criminal Procedure," 21 Mod. L.J. 387 (1958).
188 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Despite the Tumey case, four States still
permit this practice. See Lee, "The Emergence and Evolution of a Constitutional Right
to a Fair Trial Before a justice of the Peace," 20 Fed. B.J. 111 (1960). See also Jordan
v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
186 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
187 Code d'instr., art. 49 (France).
188 Id., art. 84.
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or in a decision on the merits regarding the guilt of the accused.' 89
Enumerated government officials, and particularly employees of the
police and certain other law enforcement departments are disqualified
from sitting as jurors, as are also anyone who has in the same case
been a criminal investigator or in which he is a witness, interpreter,
informer, expert, complainant, or civil party. 90 The accused is
granted five challenges to the jury. '' Provisions are made for a
change of venue if there is reason to suspect the impartiality of the
ordinary venue.19
2
INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS-RIGHT OF SILENCE
Aside from any question of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation,193 it is clear that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment forbids evidentiary use of confessions or admissions made
involuntarily or under coercion. 9 4 The same principle applies
a fortiori to the due process clause of the fifth amendment in federal
prosecutions. American law, however, generally places police officers
or other criminal investigators under no obligation to warn a suspect
that he has the right to remain silent, 9 ' or to permit him to consult
counsel during the police investigation before indictment.'96 When
the accused is brought before a committing magistrate following
arrest, the federal practice requires that he be informed of his right
to remain silent,19 7 but this requirement is presumably not demanded
by the due process clause. 98
In addition, the fifth amendment to the federal constitution and
the constitutional provisions of all the states have provisions expressly
protecting the accused from self-incrimination. 199 On the other hand,
189 Id., art. 253.
190 Id., art. 257.
191 Id., art. 297-298.
192 Id., art. 662. Indeed, the provision for a change of venue appears to be broader
than under federal practice. See Rule 21(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
193 U.S. Const. amend. V.
'94 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941).
19 A notable exception is the warning requirement in American military law,
which makes inadmissible as evidence any confessions or admissions obtained without
prior warning. UCMJ, art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1958).
196 See cases cited at notes 97 and 98, supra.
'97 Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
198 The Court has consistently pointed out that the due process dause does not
require that an accused be brought before a committing magistrate promptly after
his arrest. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191, 19S (1957).
199 McCormick, Evidence 256 (1954).
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it has been held constitutional for a state court to present the accused
with the choice of taking the stand and thus having his past convic-
tions brought before the jury, or else of refusing to testify and having
his silence commented on by the prosecution and considered by the
jury.200
While the civil law countries generally do not have constitutional
provisions regarding the right against self-incrimination or the ad-
missibility of involuntary confessions, the criminal codes often con-
tain detailed provisions on these matters, indicating that they are a
concern of the civil as well as of the common law.
Thus, under the French code of criminal procedure, the examin-
ing magistrate must, at the start of the very first hearing, warn the
accused of his right to remain silent, and the fact of such warning
must be noted in the record.2 01 The accused may be interrogated at
the trial by the presiding judge or the prosecutor, 20 ' but his right to
refuse to answer some or all questions is such accepted practice that
it is not even mentioned in the code. It should be noted that, in one
way, the right to silence is somewhat wider than in an American court,
where the accused has only two alternatives-to take the stand and
answer all questions, or to refuse to take the stand and thus be de-
prived of the chance to say anything in his own behalf. There is no
doubt that the prosecutor may comment upon, and the court may
consider, the failure of the accused to testify or to answer questions.
The problem of involuntary confessions or admissions does not,
therefore, arise at trial or during the enquite officielle-the official
preliminary examination regulated by the code of criminal procedure.
It may, however, arise as an aspect of the enquite officiese-the
interrogation by the police or other law enforcement officers in extra-
judicial proceedings. Although this form of interrogation often pre-
-cedes the preliminary investigation by the examining magistrate,
20 3
information thus obtained may be subsequently admitted in evidence
against the accused.204 There is no provision under French law for
excluding, on the grounds that it was involuntary or under coercion,
200 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The 1878 federal statute making
the accused competent to testify, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1958), declares that his failure to
do so shall not create a presumption against him; and this statute has been interpreted
to protect the defendant against comment on his claim of privilege. Johnson v. United
States, 318 U.S. 189, 199 (1943); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
Comment is forbidden in most American jurisdictions. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 412 (3d ed. 1940).
203 Code d'instr. crim., art. 114.
202 Id., art. 312, 328, 442.
203 Once the examining magistrate begins his judicial investigation, all interroga-
tories are subject to his direction. Code d'instr. crim., art. 72.
204 See Bouzat, op. cit., § 1117.
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any confession or admission obtained by the law enforcement officers
during the pre-judicial interrogation of the accused. The code expressly
states that "the confession, like all elements of proof, shall be left to
the appraisal of the judges." 0 It should be noted, however, that the
reports containing any such confession or admission are available to
the accused and his counsel °0 In addition, the official report con-
taining statements by the accused, must expressly record the length
of the interrogation to which he was subjected, the period of rest
allowed between interrogations, the exact time of arrest as well as
the exact time when the accused was released or brought before the
magistrate; and this entry is to be initialed in the margin by the
persons concerned, including the accused, ' 7 who must moreover be
advised of his rights in this regard. s It is suggested that the rights
of the accused are adequately protected if he thus has the opportunity
of discussing and challenging this evidence, both at the preliminary
investigation of the examining magistrate and at the trial, on the
ground that it was given involuntarily.09 It seems certain that a
French court would allow an accused to assert the involuntary nature
of the confession, and would consider such a confession as of little
or no probative value. Express provisions for the inadmissibility of
an involuntary confession would, however, afford a greater safeguard
for the rights of the accused and the concept of due process of law.
APPELLATE PROCEDURES AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
French criminal procedure, like most of the civil law systems,
in many cases allows the prosecution to appeal from the judgment of
the court of first instance, either because the accused has been ac-
quitted or because the prosecution thinks he should have received a
more severe sentence. Since this procedure is generally alien to com-
mon law concepts, there may be a tendency to regard it with suspicion
and to ask whether it is not counter to the constitutional right against
double jeopardy or to due process of law.
The fifth amendment protects an accused in a federal prosecution
from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. 10 Similar
provisions are generally found in the state constitutions. The due
process clause has not, however, been interpreted to bar all multiple
prosecutions. An accused can be tried successively for different of-
205 Code d'instr. crim., art. 428.
200 Id., art. 118, 197.
2 07 Id., art. 64.
208 Id., art. 63.
209 Bouzat, op. cit. § 1117.
210 U.S. Const. amend. V.
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fenses forming a part of the same transaction. 1' For identically the
same act, he may be tried by the state after a federal prosecution,212
or by the federal government after a state prosecution. 1 3 Further-
more, the state may be permitted to appeal from a decision adverse
to it in the trial court, even after an acquittal of the accused, at least
upon a question of law.214 For good cause a mistrial may be declared,
after jeopardy has attached, and the accused may be tried again at a
later time.2 1
5
French jurisprudence, as that of the civil law countries generally,
is thoroughly committed to the maxim, "Non bis in idem"-that there
shall never be two completely separate trials for the same offense. In
this, they are in agreement with the common law concept of double
jeopardy. They differ from American practice however, in that the
principle of "Non bis in idem" does not become applicable until the
trial stage of the case has been definitively completed. Under French
practice and theory, the trial of a criminal case may be in two inter-
dependent, though not independent, stages.
In the trial of petty offenses before a single magistrate, or of
misdemeanors before a tribunal correctionnel, French jurisprudence
has the theory of two stages of trial (juridiction de double degr6).
Both the accused and the prosecution (as well as, to a limited extent,
the civil party) have the right to appeal to the court of appeals from
the judgment or sentence of a tribunal correctionne210 or of the police
tribunal composed of a single magistrate.1 - The judgment of the
court of first instance is not regarded as final until either it has been
affirmed or modified by the court of appeals, or the time for appeal
has lapsed. On such appeal, the court looks de novo into the facts of
the case, and may rehear the witnesses or take new testimony. If the
court of appeals disagrees with the court of first instance, it may set
aside the judgment or sentence, or it may modify either. In any case
(except for review of questions of law by a higher court), the court
of appeals renders final judgment at the trial level: it does not remand
the case for retrial by the court of first instance. If this concept seems
strange to us, it may be noted that at least one state, Maryland, has a
211 Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958); Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571
(1958). See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), in which the United States
represented to the Supreme Court that it was the policy of the government to try at
the same time all offenses arising out of the same transaction.
212 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
213 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
214 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
215 Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
216 Code d'instr. crim., art. 497.
217 Id., art. 546.
[Vol. 21
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
similar procedure. There, minor offenses are tried by a justice of the
peace. On motion of either the accused or the prosecution (even after
an acquittal), the case may be appealed to the county court, where it
is tried de novo. 21s The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that
giving the State this right to appeal under this procedure does not
violate the federal constitution.219
In felony cases tried before the cour d'assises, however, a differ-
ent concept is applied. In these cases, the trial has only one stage,
and there can be no "appeal" to another court to review the facts of
the case or the appropriateness of sentence. The cour d'assises is com-
posed of three judges and nine jurors. The rationale of prohibiting an
"appeal" here is that there would be no point in submitting the case
again to another jury (which would really be a second trial in the
American sense), and that it would be improper to submit to profes-
sional judges in the court of appeals questions of fact which had al-
ready been passed upon by jurors chosen according to democratic
processes. Hence there can be no review, at the instance of any party,
of facts passed upon by the cour d'assises nor any review of the appro-
priateness of the sentence which it imposed.
An appeal may be taken from any lower court to the cour de
cassation, but such appeal is limited solely to questions of law.20 Such
appeal may be brought by either the accused or the prosecution or by
any party prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court,22' but a
judgment of acquittal may be appealed only in the interests of deter-
mining the correct law, and without prejudice to the acquitted party.222
That is, if the court of cassation decides that the accused was ac-
quitted on the basis of an erroneous interpretation of the law by the
lower court, the judgment of acquittal stands and the decision of the
court of cassation is to be applied only in future cases. In other cases
in which the court of cassation reverses, provision is made for remand-
ing the case for a new trial.223
CONCLUSION
Space prohibits a discussion of many other factors that go into
a system of administration of criminal justice. The right to bail, the
right to a speedy and public trial, the right to be free from unreason-
218 See Md. Code Annot., art. 52, § 13 (1957).
219 Robb v. State, 190 Md. 641 (1947). See also State v. Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d
120, 154 P.2d 826 (1945).
220 Code d'instr. crim., art. 567.
221 Ibid.
222 Id., art. 572.
223 Id., art. 605-619.
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able searches and seizures, and like matters must be ignored at the
present. Likewise, an analysis of the intangibles such as the attitude
of the police and the professional status of the bar must await subse-
quent treatment. What we have sought to do is to discuss some of
the essential elements of a system of criminal procedure from a
comparative viewpoint.
There can be no doubt that both our system of procedure and
that of the civil law nations have as their ideal the object of due
process in the broad sense, i.e., fundamental fairness. The approach
of the two systems is different and, because of this basic difference in
approach, the individual rules and doctrines which comprise the sys-
tems often differ. Before any given practice or rule can be determined
to be unfair, however, we must not only compare it with its foreign
counterpart; we must place it in the context of its own system. When
this is done, we think that due process is as much an essential fiber of
civil law procedure as it is in our own system.
